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NOru.ffiN G. CARTER, 
IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
PAULINE CARTER, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
APPELLANTS' BRIEF 
Case No. 15158 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Plaintiff brought a separate action in the Second 
Judicial District to modify a Decree of Divorce entered in the 
Fourth Judicial District. The venue was changed to the Fourth 
Judicial District and the complaint treated as an Order to 
Show Cause why the Decree should not be modified. Plaintiff 
alleged a material and substantial change of circumstances on 
the part of the divorced wife and requested that alimony be 
terminated. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The trial court reduced the alimony payment required 
by Plaintiff to defendant of $350.00 monthly to $100.00 monthly. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The Order reducing alimony to $100.00 per month 
should be modified to terminate the alimony obligation. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The parties to this appeal were divorced by a Decree 
entered in Utah County on January 22, 1976 (R. 54). That Decree 
provided for an almost exactly equal division of the parties' 
real and personal property with the plaintiff getting some 
common stock for which the defendant got no equivalent award. 
The initial Decree required the husband to pay to the divorced 
wife the sum of $275.00 per month for support and maintenance 
while she resided in the house which was the residence of the 
parties prior to its sale, and $350. 00 per month for support 
and maintenance after the sale of the home. (R. 55).. ' 
In its Findings of Fact made at the conclusion of the 
trial, the Court found the divorced wife's minimum needs to be 
$350. 00 per month after she had moved from the home which was f 
the former residence of the parties. (R. 58, 59). On October J, 
1976 the plaintiff brought an action in the Second Judicial 
District wherein the plaintiff then resided, to modify the 
Decree on grounds of changed circumstances (R. 24). The venue 
was changed to the Fourth Judicial District Court and the 
complaint treated as an Order to Show Cause and heard on 
March 24, 1977. The Court found that the defendant was then 
employed earning $636.27 per month and had $150.00 to $lGO.OO 
1 
. d dividends, j 
additional income from rental property, interest an 
• 
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and reduced the "alimony" to $100.00 per month (R.14). 
In his complaint, the plaintiff has asked for a termina-
tion of support and maintenance for the reason that the defendant 
was now fully capable of--and was--supporting herself without the 
assistance from the plaintiff. The plaintiff did not pursue a 
claimed change of circumstances for the worse on his part as an 
additional ground since in the interim between filing the complaint 
and the hearing, his health had improved. 
At the hearing, the defendant testified to being employed 
by the Davis County School District with a monthly take-home pay 
of $536.27 (TR 6). In addition, the defendant admitted that there 
was deducted from her gross, savings of $100.00, monthly, and that 
her net was actually $636.27. (TR. 7 ). Defendant's testimony 
in conjunction with Exhibit 1, her payroll record, show an addi-
tional deduction which is credited to her retirement account of 
$19. 28 monthly (TR. 8). (Exhibit 1-D). Defendant has a $5,000.00 
savings certificate placed at an annual interest of 7 1/2% and 
a $4,000.00 pass-book account at 5 1/2% (TR. 8-9). Defendant 
also has common stock, dividends on which approximate $250.00 to 
$300.00 per year, and she expects rental income from an apartment 
newly finished in her basement in the sum of $175.00 per month. 
(TR. 12). The defendant made an interest-free loan of $9,500.00 
to her daughter which is paid to her in monthly installments of 
$100.00 (TR. 14, line 12). She has in her retirement account from 
Previous employment an amount estimated to be $2,000.00. At the 
Present time, Mrs. Carter has "enough to get along" (TR. 17), 
but she is concerned that she has indadequate retirement (TR. 17-18). 
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There are no dependent children (R. 58), and the d 
purchasing her home in Kaysville, Utah (TR. 4-5). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
ALIMONY TO THE DIVORCED WIFE SHOULD BE 
TERMINATED THERE BEING NO NECESSITY AND 
efendant is 
NO BASIS IN LAW FOR THE CONTINUANCE THEREOF. 
This being the case in equity, this Court can determine 
the facts and render a decision in accordance therewith. Alldred,: 
-
v. Alldredge, 119 U 504, 229 P. 2d 681 (1951). In his decision(? 
the trial judge conluded that Mrs. Carter's net income was $636.2: 
and that with other income she had an addition al $150. 00 to $160 .. 
more. More accurately stated, her income on a monthly basis is: 
SOURCE 
Take-home pay 
Savings, deductions from check 
Dividends, $250.00 ~ 12 
Certificate interest, $5,000 at 7.5% ~ 12 
Pass-book interest, $4,000 at 5.5% • 12 
AMOUNT 
$536. 27 
100.00 
20.83 
40 .44 
18.33 
Retirement contribution, deduction from check 19.28 
Rental income .~ 
Net Income: $910.23 
on 
In addition, the defendant is able to forego interest 
$9, 500. 00 which if placed at interest at 7 1/2% would equal 
$59.29 monthly. 
t 's Thus, the plaintiff submits that Mrs. Car er 
circumstances have changed materially and substantially for the 
better since the divorce trial to a posture where she is no 
and 
longer reliant on the plaintiff for support and maintenance, 
alimony should, therefore, be terminated. 
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In another case involving parties named Carter, this 
court has pointed out that among other things, the needs and 
requirements of the divorced wife are a major circumstance to be 
considered in whether or not alimony is necessary and the amount 
thereof. carter v. Carter, 563 P.2d 177 (Utah, 1977). And in 
Hansen v. Hansen, 537 P.2d 491 (Utah, 1975), this Court rejected a 
claimed inadequacy of alimony and by implication established the 
premise that necessity is an indispensable circumstance that must 
be present for an award of alimony. 1 In the case at bar, there 
can be no dispute that the defendant (plaintiff in the original 
action) no longer needs a payment for support and maintenance. 
She has an income of $910.00 per month, is buying her home, has 
substantial savings at interest, foregoes substantial interest 
and is gainfully employed in her profession as a school teacher. 
The facts in this case are strongly similar to those in 
Dehm v. Dehm, 545 P.2d 525 (Utah, 1976). In Dehm, the original 
Decree required a payment of alimony to the divorced wife of 
$300.00 per month. At the time of the Decree, the wife had income 
of only $200.00 per month while the husband made $12,000.00 to 
$13,000.00 annually. Subsequent to the Decree, the wife's income 
increased to $946.00 per month, and the trial court refused to 
terminate or reduce the award from which Order the husband 
appealed. In writing for an unanimous Court in reversing the 
1
see also, Cummings v. Cummings, 562 P.2d 229 (Utah, 
l977), Mitchell v. Mitchell, 527 P.2d 1359 (Utah, 1974), Short 
:'.:_Short, 25 U2d 326, 481 P.2d 54 (Utah, 1971), Watts v. watts, 21 U2d 306, 445 P.2d 141 (Utah, 1968). 
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trial Court and ordering a reduction t $1 00 0 
• per year, Mr. 
Justice Maughan stated: 
"The thrust of defendant's testimony is 
that she needs this alimony in order to 
augment her retirement income and to 
maintain the insurance policy for the 
two children. No claim is made that 
alimony is needed for support, nor could 
such a claim be made, in view of her 
present ability to support herself. 
In a situation such as this, where the 
defendant is gainfully employed, making 
a salary sufficient to satisfy her needs 
is adequately housed and is in good health, 
one of the functions of alimony is not to 
provide retirement income. We do not want 
to confuse alimony with annuity." 545 P.2d 
at 528, 529. 
In this case, the defendant admits that she "has enoug' 
to get along on" (TR. 17). Additionally, her testimony seems ti 
indicate that she is concerned about retirement, and thus it fa!: 
squarely within the ruling in Dehm. Clearly then, under the 
rationale of Dehm, Mr. Carter should be relieved of the obligati 
to pay alimony. There is no need on the part of Mrs. Carter, ar 
her desire to provide retirement income is not a legal basis for 
alimony. 
But, appellant is asking this Court to go one step 
further than the decision made in Dehm. That is, to terminate 
alimony al together. Research has disclosed no Utah case where l 
has been done. This Court has affirmed findings of the trial 
court providing for a definite termination of alimony, however. 
Utah 263, 444 P. 2d 511 (l9bi See, Christensen v. Christensen, 21 
Wilson v. Wilson, 5 Utah 2d 79, 296 P. 2d 977 (1956) · In~ 
. . f m that made b; 
this Court shortened the period of termination ro 
the trial Court. On at least two occasions, this Court has Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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increased or reinstated alimony reduced or terminated at the trial 
court level. See Ring v. Ring, 511 P.2d 155 (Utah 1973) (termination); 
Felt v. Felt, 27 Utah 2d. 103, 493 P.2d 620 (1972) (reduction to $1.00). 
The court seems to be saying in Ring and Felt that stipulated--
default agreements ought not to be changed on motion for the reason 
that the agreements may have contemplated some such changes in 
circumstances as later evidence showed. Our case differs from them 
in that it was tried and a finding of needs on the part of Mrs. 
carter was made in the sum of $350.00. 
The requirement of $1.00 per year alimony fixed by this 
Court in Dehm when viewed with the modification made in the order 
of the trial court in King v. King, 495 P.2a 823, (Utah 1972) where 
this Court changed a definite termination date to allow for continu-
ing nominal alimony indicate a desire on the part of this Court 
to allow a divorced wife the benefit of continuing jurisdiction 
to deal with the alimony question. Appellant contends that the 
trend in our society is to allow the husband to live without the 
specter of alimony once the divorced wife is able to support herself. 
Women are pushing for 11 equali ty 11 and 11 independence 11 in many areas, 
and plaintiff believes that with the burgeoning expansion of self-
reliant women--Mrs. Carter being one--this Court should adopt 
the policy that when the divorced wife is no longer in need of 
alimony, the children are grown and no longer dependent and the 
woman is gainfully employed and in good health and earning an 
adequate living, she should not continue by virtue of a past 
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marriage to hold a claim for future needs in the form of a 
nominal alimony provision. This principle has been implicitly 
and expressly enunciated and adopted in the highest courts of 
several neighboring States. See, e.g. Coker v. Coker, 460 P.ld 
424 (Oklahoma, 1969) (upheld trial court's refusal of alimo~~ 
50 year old school teacher who received one-half of property); 
DeMarce v. DeMarce, 101 Ariz, 369, 419 P. 2d 726 (1966) (working 
wife's earnings although not great, when coupled with income fm 
property made alimony unnecessary). 
In McClure v. McClure, 90 New Mex. 23, 559 P.2d, 400 
( 8), the Court found that the wife's income had gone from $8,0~I 
annually to $17,400 while the husband's had gone from $26,500 
to $38,400, and therefore alimony should be terminated. The 
Court said, 
"Alimony is a personal right and not 
a property right. (Citation omitted), 
as such it should not continue without 
end if circumstances have changed. . 
and the recipient is able to support 
herself." 559 P.2d at 400. 
The Supreme Court of Washington in deciding another 
case with a fact situation marketedly similar to our's has 
stated: 
"When the physical-income producing 
property of each party is substantial, 
and when each party is trained in a 
profession and has the ability to earn 
and is earning a living, it is not the 
policy of the law to give a wife a 
perpetual lien upon her divorced 
husband's future earnings." Young v. 
Young, 47 Wash. 2d 497, 288 P.2d 463 
at 465 (1955). 
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saying thus, the Court modified a perpetual Order to terminate 
alimony in three years. Again in Washington in another strikingly 
similar case--where a 50 year old wife earned $5,500 annually 
as a school teacher and the 51 year old husband made $12,000 
annually and the Decree had apportioned $9,000 of the property 
to him and $13,000 of the property to her--the trial court 
entered an Order requiring the payment of $150.00 per month 
alimony. On the appeal of the husband, the Washington Court 
reversed, terminating alimony, saying: 
"There is no evidence of an existing 
or reasonably anticipated future 
impairment of (wife's) health that now 
adversely effects her earning capacity. 
It is, therefore, clear that a finding 
of necessity, upon which an award of alimony 
depends cannot be based upon the con-
jectural possibilities of a future 
change in circumstances. Morgan v. 
Morgan, 59 Wash. 2d 639, 369 P.2d 
516 at 519. 
Mrs. Carter's argument is that she is entitled to 
continuing alimony to insulate her from the vagaries of the 
future. The appellant asks the Court to relieve him of the 
obligation of ensuring Mrs. Carter's future and reject her 
position as not cognizable under the law of our State. 
CONCLUSION 
The defendant is receiving in various forms at 
least $910.00 per month. She is in a position where her 
own assessment of her financial picture allows her to make an 
interest-free loan at a cost to her of $59.00 per month. She 
is getting along all right but is concerned for her future. 
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The parties divided substantial assets and are now b · 
re uilcting 
their lives separately. Each is employed at a good wage, is 
in good health and meeting their obligations. Under such 
circumstances, neither party should--in equity and fairness·· 
continue to hold a claim against the other. The appellant 
therefore respectfully urges this Court to relieve him of the 
obligation to pay alimony to the defendant. 
Respectfully submitted, 
~~~> L~~NKLIN ALLRED 
Attorney for Appellant 
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